The Florida State University 
Tallahassee, Florida  32306-1043

College of Law

				March 10, 1995

Mr. Eric J. Thorn 
Legislative Analyst 
House Republican Office 
323 The Capitol 
Tallahassee, FL  32399-1300

Dear Mr. Thorn:

This is in response to your inquiries regarding HCR 1401, which
calls for the convening of a "Conference of the States" and would
authorize Florida's participation in such a conference. As
professors of constitutional law at the Florida State University
College of Law, we are extremely troubled by the possibility that
this proposed Conference could be construed as an application for
a constitutional convention under Article V of the United States
Constitution. Such a convention could evolve into a wholesale
assault on our Constitution, and lead to proposals for destroying
our present constitutional system. The history of the 1787
constitutional convention indicates that once a constitutional
convention is convened, the delegates to that convention could
expand the agenda of the convention beyond its original purposes,
dictate their own rules for the ratification of the convention's
proposals, and therefore circumvent the fairly strict requirements
of Article V. Moreover, again using the 1787 experience as our
model, no external authority -- neither Congress, the courts, nor
states that disagree with the convention's proposals -- would have
the legal authority to reject the convention's decisions if the
convention itself deemed those decisions binding on the entire
country.

Our conclusions about the dangers of the "Conference" proposed in
HCR 1401 are not mitigated by the ambiguous phrasing of the
proposal, nor by the final subsection stating that the Concurrent
Resolution :does not constitute an application by the Legislature
of the State of Florida for the calling of a federal
Constitutional Convention within the meaning of Article V of the
United States Constitution."  It is essential to keep in mind that
the 'Conference of the States' could define its objectives for
itself, and could reject preexisting limitation on its authority,
just as the 1787 convention abandoned the limitation imposed on it
by the Articles of Confederation. The broad language of the
Concurrent Resolution authorizes the Conference to "reform the
Federal Government" and authorizes Conference delegates to
"propose, debate, and vote on elements of an action plan to
restore checks and balances between the states and the national
government."  These broad mandates could easily be construed by
the Conference as providing it the authority to fundamentally
revise our existing constitutional structure.

It is the strange (and dangerous) nature of a constitutional
convention that it defines its own objectives and sets the
guidelines for its own success. Once a constitutional convention
begins, the only limit on its power is political. The federal
courts have consistently refused to entertain questions regarding
the legitimacy of constitutional amendments (see Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (19139)). Therefore, a new constitutional
convention presents the disturbing prospect of many different
political bodies -- the Conference, the existing federal
government, dissenting states -- all vying for preeminent
political authority without the possibility of judicial review to
settle the dispute peacefully. This is truly a recipe for a
constitutional crisis, and the destabilizing effects of such a
crisis would reach into every aspect of our political, legal, and
economic life.

We emphatically urge the Florida legislature to reject HCR 1401,
or at the very least to postpone decision on the Concurrent
Resolution until the legislature has given careful and detailed
consideration to the many potentially disastrous implications that
accompany even an ambiguous call for a constitutional convention.
The United States Constitution is the greatest political document
since the Magna Carta. Much of this country's strength and
international moral authority are attributable to the
Constitution's careful balancing of rights, responsibilities, and
powers. Joining a "Conference of the States" as defined in HCR
1401 is the first, radical step down a very slippery slope toward
upsetting that balance. We urge you to resist taking that step.

				Sincerely,
				[signature]
				Steven G. Gay
				John W. and Ashley E. Frost
				Professor of Law

				[signature]
				Nat Stern
				Professor of Law