NOTE: While reading this - or any government / internationalist report, it's important to read every word very carefully. They say what they mean and they mean what they say and it is so often couched in vague, almost 'coded' language that their intentions can be overlooked. We've taken a few liberties here . The report is untouched other than emphasizing some statements in bold face and or underlining. All quotation marks, etc. are part of the report as compiled and posted on the website from which it was extracted (nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf)
Why do we take the liberty of emphasizing and underlining in places? Because some of our site visitors are in a very basic stage of awakening, and certain statements and terminology that might otherwise escape their attention are emphasized to hopefully facilitate their understanding. -- Sincerely, Jackie -- November 25, 2002
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http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf
The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
Part 1
Data Compiled By 'mebs'
4-20-1
FINAL DRAFT REPORT - EMBARGOED UNTIL JAN. 31, 2001
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
January 31, 2001
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century*1
Gary Hart - Co-Chair [cfr]
Warren B.Rudman - Co-Chair [cfr]
Anne Armstrong Norman - Commissioner [cfr Anne L. Armstrong]
[Norman] R. Augustine - Commissioner [cfr]
John Dancy - Commissioner
John R. Galvin - Commissioner [cfr]
Leslie H. Gelb - Commissioner [cfr]
Newt Gingrich - Commissioner [cfr]
Lee H. Hamilton - Commissioner [cfr]
Donald B. Rice - Commissioner [cfr]
James Schlesinger - Commissioner [cfr]
Harry D. Train - Commissioner [cfr]
Andrew Young - Commissioner [cfr - TLC - Bild]
Contents
Foreword, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman
Preface, Charles G. Boyd [cfr]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction: Imperative for Change
I. Securing the National Homeland
A. The Strategic Framework
B. Organizational Realignment.
C. Executive-Legislative Cooperation
II. Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education
A. Investing in Innovation
B. Education as a National Security Imperative
III. Institutional Redesign
A. Strategic Planning and Budgeting
B. The National Security Council
C. Department of State
D. Department of Defense
E. Space Policy
F. The Intelligence Community
IV. The Human Requirements for National Security
A. A National Campaign for Service to the Nation
B. The Presidential Appointments Process.
C. The Foreign Service
D. The Civil Service
E. Military Personnel
V. The Role of Congress
A Final Word
Appendix 1: The Recommendations
Appendix 2: The USCNS/21 Charter
Appendix 3: Commissioner Biographies and Staff Listing
Foreword
American power and influence have been decisive factors for democracy and security throughout the last half-century. However, after more than two years of serious effort, this Commission has concluded that without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained. To be of long-term benefit to us and to others, that power and influence must be disciplined by strategy, defined as the systematic determination of the proper relationship of ends to means in support of American principles, interests, and national purpose.
This Commission was established to redefine national security in this age and to do so in a more comprehensive fashion than any other similar effort since 1947. We have carried out our duties in an independent and totally bipartisan spirit. This report is a blueprint for reorganizing the U.S. national security structure in order to focus that structure's attention on the most important new and serious problems before the nation, and to produce organizational competence capable of addressing those problems creatively.
The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat. Without creative strategic planning in this new environment, we will default in time of crisis to a reactive posture. Such a posture is inadequate to the challenges and opportunities before us. {to rule the world with an iron fist - when the velvet glove has been fully removed}.
We have concluded that, despite the end of the Cold War threat, America faces distinctly new dangers, particularly to the homeland and to our scientific and educational base. These dangers must be addressed forthwith.
We call upon the new President, the new administration, the new Congress, and the country at large to consider and debate our recommendations in the pragmatic spirit that has characterized America and its people in each new age.
Gary Hart; Co-Chair
Warren B. Rudman; Co-Chair
Preface
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century was born more than two years ago out of a conviction that the entire range of U.S. national security policies and processes required reexamination in light of new circumstances . Those circumstances encompass not only the changed geopolitical reality after the Cold War, but also the significant technological, social, and intellectual changes that are occurring.
Prominent among such changes is the information revolution and the accelerating discontinuities in a range of scientific and technological areas
Another is the increased integration of global finance and commerce, commonly called "globalization."
Yet another is the ascendance of democratic governance and free-market economics to unprecedented levels, and another still the increasing importance of both multinational and non-governmental actors in global affairs
The routines of professional life, too, in business, university, and other domains in advanced countries have been affected by the combination of new technologies and new management techniques.
The internal cultures of organizations have been changing, usually in ways that make them more efficient and effective.
The creators of this Commission believed that unless the U.S. government adapts itself to these changes - and to dramatic changes still to come - it will fall out of step with the world of the 21st century.
Nowhere will the risks of doing so be more manifest than in the realm of national security.
Mindful of the likely scale of change ahead, this Commission's sponsors urged it to be bold and comprehensive in its undertaking. That meant thinking out a quarter century, not just to the next election or to the next federal budget cycle.
That meant searching out how government should work, undeterred by the institutional inertia that today determines how it does work.
Not least, it meant conceiving national security not as narrowly defined, but as it ought to be defined-to include economics, technology, and education for a new age in which novel opportunities and challenges coexist uncertainly with familiar ones.
The fourteen Commissioners involved in this undertaking, one that engaged their energies for over two years, have worked hard and they have worked well.*2 Best of all, despite diverse experiences and views, they have transcended partisanship to work together in recognition of the seriousness of the task: nothing less than to assure the well-being of this Republic a quarter century hence.
This Commission has conducted its work in three phases.
Phase I was dedicated to understanding how the world will likely evolve over the next 25 years. {If their manipulation and intervention and intrusion into national governments is sucessful} From that basis in prospective reality,
Phase II devised a U.S. national security strategy to deal with {manage} that world. {In their words, from their book Our Global Neighborhood, p xvii - co-chairman's forward "This is not to say that the goal should be a world without systems or rules. Far from it. A chaotic world would post equal or even greater danger. The challenge is to strike the balance in such a way that the management of global affairs is responsive to the interests of all people in a sustainable future, that it is guided by basic human values, and that it makes global organization conform to the reality of global diversity."
Phase III aims to reform government structures and processes to enable the U.S. government to implement that strategy, or, indeed, any strategy that would depart from the embedded routines of the last half-century.
Phase I concluded in September 1999 with the publication of New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century.*3
Phase II produced the April 2000 publication, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.
Phase III, presented in these pages, is entitled Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.
This report summarizes enough of the Commission's Phase I and Phase II work to establish an intellectual basis for understanding this Phase III report, but it does not repeat the texts of prior phases in detail. For those seeking fuller background to this report, the Commission's earlier works should be consulted directly.*4
In Road Map for National Security, the Commission has endeavored to complete the logic of its three phases of work, moving from analysis to strategy to the redesign of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security system.
For example, in Phase I the Commission stressed that mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland was of serious and growing concern. It therefore proposed in Phase II a strategy that prioritizes deterring, defending against, and responding effectively to such dangers. Thus, in Phase III, it recommends a new National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate departments and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today.
That said, not every Phase I finding and not every Phase II proposal has generated a major Phase III recommendation. Not every aspect of U.S. national security organization needs an overhaul.
Moreover, some challenges are best met, and some opportunities are best achieved, by crafting better policies, not by devising new organizational structures or processes. Where appropriate, this report notes those occasions and is not reluctant to suggest new policy directions.
Many of the recommendations made herein require legislation to come into being. {It has, via the Homeland Security Act} Many others, however, require only Presidential order or departmental directive. These latter recommendations are not necessarily of lesser importance and can be implemented quickly.
The Commission anticipates that some of its recommendations will win wide support. Other recommendations may generate controversy and even opposition, as is to be expected when dealing with such serious and complex issues. We trust that the ensuing debate will ultimately yield the very best use of this Commission's work for the benefit of the American people.
Organizational reform is not a panacea. There is no perfect organizational design, no flawless managerial fix. The reason is that organizations are made up of people, and people invariably devise informal means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of personality and temperament. Even excellent organizational structure cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make good leaders less effective.
Sound organization is important. It can ensure that problems reach their proper level of decision quickly and efficiently and can balance the conflicting imperatives inherent in any national security decision-system-between senior involvement and expert input, between speed and the need to consider a variety of views, between tactical flexibility and strategic consistency.
President Eisenhower summarized it best: "Organization cannot make a genius out of a dunce. But it can provide its head with the facts he needs, and help him avoid msinformed mistakes."
Most important, good organization helps assure accountability. At every level of organization, elected officials-and particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief-must be able to ascertain quickly and surely who is in charge.
[NOTE: Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 - U.S. Constitution. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;" When the Congress declares war - and only then - the president is Commander in Chief. - JP]
But in a government that has expanded through serial incremental adjustment rather than according to an overall plan, finding those responsible to make things go right, or those responsible when things go wrong, can be a very formidable task. This, we may be sure, is not what the Founders had in mind.
This Commission has done its best to step up to the mandate of its Charter. It is now up to others to do their best to bring the benefits of this Commission's effort into the institutions of American government.
Charles G. Boyd, General, USAF (Ret.)
Executive Director
Next: Executive Summary. New Dept. of Homeland Security built on FEMA; Taking control of Science and Education, including allocating funding; Restructuring of Executive Branch, Congress; overhauling the U.S. government personnel system}
CFR Phase III
Report on National Homeland
Security
The Phase III
Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st
Century
Bush Signs Homeland
Security Bill
The Homeland
Security Act of 2002
Homeland
Security Flow Chart
Kissinger:
The Secret Side of our Secretary of
State
Court Denies
Office of Homeland Security
Motion
Tom Ridge
Confesses Terror Alerts Were
Bogus
|
